The Fourth Circuit’s September 1, 2026 disposition in Nonprecedential Opinion, No. 26-4129, is designated nonprecedential, which immediately matters for how lawyers should read and use it. Even without binding effect, unpublished appellate opinions can offer a useful window into how a panel is applying familiar standards of review, handling procedural defects, and evaluating the arguments that do—or do not—gain traction on appeal.

Because the decision is expressly nonprecedential, it does not alter existing Fourth Circuit law in the formal sense.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit filed a nonprecedential opinion in No. 25-7002 on August 31, 2026. Because the disposition is expressly nonprecedential, its practical importance lies less in creating binding circuit law and more in how it illustrates the court’s application of settled appellate principles to the facts of the case.

For practitioners, the key takeaway is procedural as much as substantive: unpublished or nonprecedential Fourth Circuit opinions can still offer valuable guidance on how the panel approaches preservation, standards of review, and the sufficiency of the record on appeal.

The Fourth Circuit’s August 12, 2026 disposition in Nonprecedential Opinion, No. 25-4369, appears to be a routine unpublished appellate ruling, but it still offers a useful reminder for practitioners about the practical significance of nonprecedential decisions in federal appellate practice. Because the opinion is expressly designated nonprecedential, its legal force is limited: it resolves the dispute between the parties, but it does not establish binding circuit law in the way a published opinion would.

That distinction matters.

A June 17, 2026 filing in the Fourth Circuit puts a familiar but strategically significant appellate issue front and center: whether an appeal should be dismissed before the merits briefing even begins. In No. 25, appellees Debra Campbell, the City of Asheville, and Esther Elizabeth Manheimer moved to dismiss the appeal in Case No. 26-1014, asking the court to terminate the proceeding at the outset rather than allow it to move forward on a full briefing schedule.

Although the short docket entry does not itself spell out every ground raised, motions like this typically target threshold defects that go to the appellate court’s power to hear the case at all.

A June 17 filing in the Fourth Circuit could stop appeal No. 26-1014 before merits briefing ever begins. In No. 25 MOTION, Debra Campbell, the City of Asheville, and Esther Elizabeth Manheimer ask the court to dismiss the appeal outright—a reminder that appellees do not always need to wait for full briefing to challenge whether an appeal belongs in federal appellate court at all.

Although the docket entry provides only the motion’s caption-level description, the filing appears to be a classic threshold attack on the appeal itself.

Former FBI Director James Comey has made his first court appearance in a criminal case alleging he made a threat against former President Donald Trump, launching what could become a closely watched test of how federal prosecutors prove criminal intent in politically charged speech cases.

The prosecution, styled US v. James Comey, Jr., is drawing unusual scrutiny not only because of Comey’s public profile, but because it lands squarely at the fault line between criminal threats law and First Amendment protections.

Chief Justice John Roberts has temporarily halted a lower-court order directing the federal government to return Kilmar Abrego Garcia from El Salvador, escalating what is quickly becoming one of the most closely watched emergency immigration disputes on the Court’s shadow docket.

The case arises from the government’s acknowledgment that Abrego Garcia was deported because of an “administrative error,” despite a lower court’s conclusion that he was lawfully present and could not be removed without due process.